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TOWARDS A NEW HISTORY OF THE PURGE OF THE MILITARY, 1937-1938 
 







The Great Terror was a defining moment of the Stalin era, indeed perhaps the 
defining moment of twentieth-century Russian history. The purge of the military is a 
striking subplot with the potential to unlock the mystery which still surrounds the 
Terror. Why did Stalin feel the need to decimate his general staff and officer corps on 
the eve of a world war at the same time as military spending was rising at a 
breakneck pace? Why destroy with one hand while building with the other? There is 
no adequate solution to this problem in the existing literature, and recent work does 
fully not take into account the great wealth of archival materials released in the last 
twenty years. This historiographical review will seek to evaluate the historiography of 
the military purge in showing how the literature has evolved, highlighting the 
diversity of approaches, where there is consensus, where unanswered questions 
remain and how it is now possible to advance a more comprehensive explanation of 










Throughout the 1930s and particularly during the Terror many members of the armed 
forces, in particular those of high rank, were expelled from the military and in some 
cases executed.1 The most famous victim Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich 
Tukhachevskii was executed after a closed military trial on 12 June 1937 to great 
international uproar. Today the military purge still has particular resonance and the 
decapitation of the red army is commonly seen as contributing to its poor performance 
in the early years of the Second World War. Yet even though the red army purges 
have now been examined from a number of standpoints, no adequate or convincing 
explanation as to why Stalin would destroy his military elite has been presented. The 
most common interpretation sees Stalin destroying and subduing his military in 1937 
as part of his domination through terror.2 A fabricated dossier, passed from abroad in 
1937 which allegedly revealed a military conspiracy, is presented as providing Stalin 
the reason to eliminate several leading members of the red army command.3 However, 
this dossier has never been found in the archives. Such an interpretation of Stalin’s 
removal of a section of the military elite was derived from sources including 
contemporary accounts, memoir materials and a restricted number of officially 
sanctioned documents. However, beyond questions of reliability a consequence of 
such a restricted source base focussing on the 1937 dossier has been the narrowing of 
the examination of the military purge to the Terror years, leading to it being named 
the so-called ‘Tukhachevskii Affair.’ With the opening of the soviet archives there is 
no reason to constrain analysis of the military purge to Terror years only, and released 
archival materials allow for a more sophisticated account of the military purge and 
one which indicates that the purge of the military elite was not initiated as a means to 




   Since the founding of the red army there were many reasons for Stalin to doubt the 
loyalty of his armed forces and the military purge of 1937-1938 should be viewed not 
as one single affair surrounding an alleged dossier, but as the culmination of 
suspicions and doubts which gained currency in an atmosphere of high international 
and domestic tension seen in the Terror years. In particular, the secret police had the 
red army under surveillance since the Civil War and periodic purge activity was 
present within the military also from this point. A dynamic between the 
OGPU/NKVD, the red army and also international events is present from the end of 
the Civil War and has documented significance. The link between members of the red 
army and the Trotskyist political opposition of the 1920s has been shown definitively 
and the involvement of the military in the changing political climate from Lenin’s 
death is a key issue. Conflicts between members of the command staff were common 
prior to the outbreak of the Terror and these must be examined in relation to the 
military purge. Such areas of analysis are vital towards a fuller understanding the 
military purge and any starting point must be 1917, taking a much broader focus than 
the narrow ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’, and bringing the study of interwar Party – military 
relations in line with an analysis of the political processes leading to the Terror 
   From 1937 numerous attempts have been made to explain the military purge, and 
following the June trial itself reaction was instant in the foreign contemporary press 
and speculation began. The Manchester Guardian argued that the purge was a 
response to an attempted military plot,4 yet not all newspapers were as definitive, but 
acknowledged Stalin’s ambition for power.5 In memoir literature from individuals 
living in Moscow during the Terror, such as the journalist Walter Duranty, the 
military purge is presented as a reaction to the actual existence of a military 




made an attempt at analysing the military purge with similar conclusions to those of 
the contemporary press and in memoir literature.7 In all, certain unifying themes 
appear in such early accounts of the military purge; Stalin’s desire for power, his 
willingness to take extreme measures to safeguard this and speculation over a possible 
military conspiracy.8   
   The first serious attention given to the military purge was in the work of historians 
writing in the 1960s and 1970s in both English and Russian. Historians such as John 
Erickson, Robert Conquest, Adam Ulam and Lev Nikulin saw the military purge in a 
similar light, namely, that this was a move by Stalin as part of an escalation of terror 
to increase his power and to neutralize a potential threat.9 Yuri Petrov regarded the 
purge as a result of Stalin’s abuse of power as a result of the growing cult of 
personality.10 In either case Stalin’s power is the key theme, and the military were 
subjected to a dramatic purge, stamping out any possible independence. In this 
interpretation Stalin is portrayed as not reacting to real threats but acting decisively 
and pre-emptively against any possible challenge.11 The story surrounding the 
fabricated dossier, the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’, appears in all such works and relating 
memoir accounts of from individuals such as Czechoslovakian President Eduard 
Benes which provided the details of the story were taken at face value.12 Indeed, the 
above historians examined the military purge following the revelations made during 
Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin campaign, who himself gave a boost in credibility to the 
story when he acknowledged the dossier story in October 1961.13 Yet such a narrow 
focus on the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’ neglects the importance of state-military relations 
prior to the escalation of the Terror.14 Further, the timing of the military purge and a 
comprehensive examination of the international context need more thorough attention 




and the security of the Soviet Union in removing highly talented figures from the 
army in this dangerous context to subjugate the armed forces? A further question is 
how Stalin would find himself in such a position, if indeed he was such a meticulous 
planner, of having promoted to the highest ranks people who he did not fully trust. If 
Stalin aim was absolute control, why were the careers of Mikhail Tukhachevskii, Iona 
Yakir and Avgust Kork advanced to where they achieved high seniority? 
     Further questions were raised over the above accounts of the military purge by 
historians reassessing the Cold War interpretation of the Terror in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Arch Getty viewed the military purge as a problematic historical episode with 
a lack of convincing evidence,16 and he questioned the events leading to the June trial 
noting that there seemed a certain amount of indecision over what to do with the 
generals under suspicion.17 Similarly Gábor Rittersporn  noted that it was an unusual 
move to transfer the suspect Tukhachevskii to head the Volga Military District on the 
11th May, as ‘this was hardly the usual treatment of dangerous conspirators.’18 Both 
Getty and Rittersporn argue for an element of uncertainty in Stalin’s actions and 
importantly that there is little indication of a well-designed intrigue. 
   With the release of archival materials from the opening of the soviet archives in the 
early 1990s more narrowly focused studies of the red army throughout the Terror 
period began to appear, such as from Roger Reese, Oleg Suvenirov and Sergei 
Minakov, and all have broadened the analysis of the military purge beyond the 
‘Tukhachevskii Affair.’19 From the perspective of political and social history Reese 
argues that a practice of purging (chistki) had already been established throughout the 
1920s and 1930s within the military with the aim of improving ideological conformity 
and removing class aliens and socially harmful elements.20 Such a distinction between 




Reese elaborates that within the climate of fear seen throughout the Terror and the 
mass denunciation seen in the search for “enemies of the people”, this activity spread 
quickly through the red army as ‘the rank and file were conditioned through chistki to 
see class enemies and wreckers in all walks of life.’22 An established internal practice 
of army purging transformed into a vehicle of mass denunciation in 1937. As such, 
Reese places focus on the lower ranks and how the individuals responded to the call 
to root out ‘enemies of the people.’  
   Oleg Suvenirov traces the purge prior to 1937 seeing the military purge as a broader 
series of events than the narrow focus of the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’ and he provides a 
detailed documentation of military arrests from the early 1930s. Suvenirov raises a 
number of significant issues, such as the prevalence of accusations of spies in the 
military, the number arrested over accusations of espionage and that the number of 
spy-groups uncovered by the OGPU increased during the early 1930s.23 He highlights 
an increase in purge activity following the Kirov assassination in 1934 which he 
estimates as a following wave of tens or hundreds of military arrests, and 
consequently the extent to which the military’s fate was tied to political events is 
touched upon.24 The role of People’s Commissar for Defence Kliment Voroshilov is 
shown in that he had to approve all military arrests during the Terror and is directly 
implicated in the scale of the military purge.25  
   From a perspective of civil-military relations Sergei Minakov takes the October 
revolution as a starting point. Minakov describes how Tukhachevskii was regarded as 
a ‘Bonapartist’ figure in White émigré circles and that such groups held out hope for a 
future military coup.26 The disinformation campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s which 
consistently presented Tukhachevskii as a counter-revolutionary are highlighted and 




as contributing to a perception of factionalism in the red army elite.27 According to 
Minakov in the context of the Terror such power struggles and rumours of 
Tukhachevskii’s ‘Bonapartism’ were all construed and perceived as a military 
conspiracy. Minakov is clear in noting the absence of any evidence of an actual 
military plot in 1937, however, he argues that the regime acted preventively on 
rumour in line with how its perception of state-military relations changed during the 
Terror.28  
   From the above historians only Minakov attempts to answer the question of why 
Stalin would purge his military elite. Reese and Suvenirov explore the dynamics of 
the purge process, showing that the tide of denunciation could not have been wholly 
directed by Stalin and highlight purge activity prior to the ‘Tukhachevskii Affair’, but 
they do not convincingly point to why the purge process began. Reese only speculates 
over Stalin’s possible desire to subjugate the military.29 Yet Minakov’s work is 
flawed by a number of conclusions based on unreliable or insufficient evidence.30 
Minakov highlights dissatisfaction of certain members of the high command towards 
Voroshilov and that they tried to have him replaced, but this is founded on weak 
evidence and is an issue needing further exploration.31 Minakov emphasizes the 
particular context of the Terror and he notes that this allowed rumour to be perceived 
as reality, and thus the regime perceived counterrevolution in the military based on 
army factionalism and myths surrounding Tukhachevskii as a Bonaparte; but there is 
far more to be explored here. The question is what specifically would lead Stalin to 
perceive rumour as reality, and what events and processes led to a change of 
perception toward the military elite? To answer this question the influences to Stalin’s 




   Newly released document collections containing archival material have provided a 
sense of Stalin’s thought processes and the nature of his decision making.32 A number 
of themes stand out which all have importance and relevance in examining the 
military purge. Firstly, from reading Stalin’s personal correspondence with his closest 
subordinates Kaganovich and Molotov it is clear that international affairs occupied 
him greatly and that he was concerned over both espionage and changes in the 
international situation. Archival materials show that Stalin was directly fed 
information by the OGPU/NKVD concerning counter-revolutionary plots and 
espionage and this is now well documented particularly through the Lubianka series 
of documents and a number of recently published works. All show that such secret 
reports were sent directly to Stalin.33 Yet, it is how Stalin perceived such reports of 
anti-soviet activity, which is of greater significance. Indeed, Stalin can be seen to 
perceive reports of counterrevolutionary activity through the lens of foreign policy. 
The Nakhaev affair is a good example of an anti-soviet action which revealed Stalin’s 
preoccupation with foreign espionage. In August 1934, Nakhaev, an artillery Division 
Chief of Staff within Osoaviakhim, attempted an uprising against the regime, however 
due to its small size it was quickly put down. Stalin received direct communication of 
this event from Kaganovich, and pressed the point that Nakhaev had to be working for 
foreign powers. In a letter to Kaganovich Stalin wrote ‘The Nakhaev affair is about a 
piece of scum. He is, of course (of course!), not alone. He must be put up against the 
wall and forced to talk – to tell the whole truth and then severely punished. He must 
be a Polish-German (or Japanese) agent.’34 The charge of being an agent for foreign 
powers was subsequently added to Nakhaev’s indictment, and it has also been argued 
that this gave a signal to the OGPU/NKVD that Stalin desired the routing out of 




   Such counterrevolutionary actions and plots, both real and fabricated, were 
‘revealed’ by the OGPU/NKVD within the red army long before the well-known 
‘Tukhachevskii Affair’ of 1937. Stalin was informed about military plots and 
espionage consistently throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Such an example was the 
military plot ‘uncovered’ in the Ukrainian Military District in February 1931.36 
Suvenirov as noted has tracked a series of alleged counterrevolutionary groups 
revealed by the OGPU/NKVD from the early 1930s.37 The Party leadership would be 
alert to such counterrevolutionary groups within the red army and as such the military, 
like other spheres of soviet society, was not free from real or fabricated anti-soviet 
agitation prior to the Terror. Concern over counter-revolutionary groups and 
espionage activity within the red army was shown in strong terms on the part of the 
secret police and has seen more in-depth analysis in Organi gosudarstvennoi 
bezopastnosti i Krasnaia armiia: deyatelnost organov VChK – OGPU po 
obespecheniiu bezopastnosti RKKA (1921-1934) by A. A. Zdanovich. Here 
Zdanovich clearly demonstrates the complex relationship between the OGPU/NKVD 
and the red army, in particular the secret police’s continual search for counter-
revolutionary groups and the exposure of plots within the armed forces, sharpening 
especially in years of crisis such as during the collectivisation campaign.38 Zdanovich 
notes that the OGPU were the permanent monitors of the mood in the red army, 
looking for any anti-Party feeling and that they aimed to stop any manipulation of the 
troops.39 A key element of Zdanovich’s argument is the links between the hunt for 
counterrevolutionary groups within the red army and the changes in the international 
situation, in the context of foreign espionage. Published OGPU circulars show that 
great attention was paid to troops stationed on the border regions, as these would be 




crisis, for example through a worsening international situation or domestic strain 
caused by collectivisation, concern over the reliability of the red army grew.41 Such 
concern led to increased OGPU/NKVD activity within the troops.42 Zdanovich thus 
demonstrates that there is a clear link between the international situation and action 
taken towards the red army and that for much of the 1920s and early 1930s the level 
of trust towards the military was not high. The rank-and-file and those of higher rank 
were kept under observation, which increased at times of crisis; a sign of a lack of 
trust in the army, the institution so vital for defence. Consequently, any examination 
of the military purge of leading military figures in 1937 must take such a link into 
account, how changing domestic and international events altered perceptions of Army 
loyalty. Such a consideration is especially important as the international situation 
continued to deteriorate throughout the 1930s.  
    Stalin’s attitude towards senior military figures can be seen through an analysis of 
changing domestic political policy and the changing political climate needs to be 
examined in relation to the red army. It has been well established that certain leading 
military figures arrested in 1936 later to be put on trial in June 1937 had at a time 
been supporters of the Trotskyist opposition in the 1920s.43 Yet the role of 
‘Trotskyist’ officers such as Primakov and Putna has not been examined fully in 
relation to the 1937 purge, and to what extent a link exists between the arrests in 1936 
and those in 1937. Indeed, it has also shown how members of the high command who 
had supported Trotskii had been kept under very close observation for a long period 
of time.44 The OGPU had in 1927 tried to piece together a Trotskyist military 
conspiracy, using supposed links with Trotskyist underground pamphlet materials, 
however the evidence for such a plot was not strong enough and even Menzhinskii, 




of such surveillance and thus raises questions as to what caused the decision to arrest 
those already under observation and what the contribution was of the arrests in 
autumn1936 to the later main military purge trial in 1937. By 1936 both Primakov 
and Putna were both well-travelled having occupied positions as military attaches in 
various countries and at the time of his arrest Primakov held a high-ranking position 
as the deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District. Indeed, for men who had 
been under observation and suspicion, both had been given a great deal of 
responsibility during their military service. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria 
in September 1931, red army strength was reinforced in the Far East from early 1932. 
Interestingly Putna was recalled from Berlin, where he had been a military attaché, to 
command a new maritime province.46 It can be said that this shows a level of trust 
towards this former supporter of the opposition, stationing him in such a tense and 
sensitive area. The question over the regime’s level of trust in those military figures, 
those who at one time supported the political opposition is an interesting one. Clearly 
they received responsibility after recanting their support for Trotskii, but this 
oppositionist association in the end brought their arrest. To truly appreciate what 
happened to such officers, the political processes which led to the arrests of former 
supporters of the opposition in 1936 need to be aligned with where this support had 
manifested in the red army. Unfortunately Zdanovich’s study does not go beyond 
1934, however, it highlights that the political reliability of senior military figures was 
a constant concern for the OGPU/NKVD.  
   However, it was not only the former Trotskyist officers were tainted by oppositional 
activity and those who had kept a distance from Trotskii were still at risk of 
association with opposition. In the summer of 1930 Tukhachevskii was implicated in 




Kakurin. The OGPU was piecing together a military conspiracy and had arrested a 
number of military men in a wider sweep of the red army academies. This was part of 
the OGPU operation ‘vesna’ which targeted ex-tsarist officers, so-called ‘military 
specialists, serving in the red army. Military specialists since their introduction in the 
ranks had caused anxiety for the Party, and there had been numerous questions raised 
over their loyalty.47 As part of vesna Troitskii and Kakurin were arrested. Both gave 
testimony which implicated Tukhachevskii in a military plot looking to overthrow the 
regime. Stalin, however, was unconvinced of Tukhachevskii’s involvement in any 
kind of plot describing him as ‘clean.’48 Two years later as part of the case against the 
Smirnov-Eismont political oppositionist group of 1932 Politburo stenograms show 
that Tukhachevskii’s name is mentioned within a denunciation of Eismont. In this 
denunciation Eismont was accused of inquiring over the mood of Tukhachevskii, 
hinting indirectly at the nature of his attitude towards the regime.49 Two years earlier 
in similar denunciation of the Syrtsov-Lominadze oppositionist group the name 
another senior military figure later to be sentenced with Tukhachevskii, Ieronim 
Uborevich, is mentioned as part of the case against Syrtsov. In his denunciation 
Resnikov accuses Syrtsov of describing Uborevich as ambitious and a ‘thermidor.’50 
The question here is not only why both Tukhachevskii and Uborevich’s names appear 
in the denunciations, but how this matter was resolved and what happened to both 
men as a result of these incidents? In both cases Tukhachevskii and Uborevich’s 
names are associated with unreliability and it is implied that they were possible 
figures who could be relied upon to carry out a military coup. Indeed, even if little 
came in terms of arrests, it is unlikely that Stalin would not forget that these names 
had come up in both opposition cases. Consequently, the question of military 




Lenin’s death. A number of officers were involved in the Trotskyist opposition in the 
1920s, and in the early 1930s both Tukhachevskii and Uborevich associated in the 
case against oppositionists and Tukhachevskii in a counterrevolutionary plot. It is 
worth noting that concurrent to these events, in the early 1930s, Tukhachevskii had 
won Stalin’s trust in implementing his army modernisation plan and had secured a 
promotion, despite earlier attempts by the OGPU to link him to oppositional activity. 
Interestingly, it was not only those military leaders who were purged who came under 
a cloud of suspicion. In a letter to Stalin from 1 February 1923, Voroshilov questioned 
Semen Budennyi’s loyalty, the famed cavalry leader and one of the few military 
leaders to survive the Stalin era. Voroshilov raised the concern that as Budennyi was 
so popular with the peasants, that in the event of an uprising, he may side with the 
peasantry in a revolt. As such, it seems nearly all military leaders, even those close to 
Stalin, fell under suspicion at one time or another.51 
   A further angle to be explored is what attitudes senior military figures held towards 
the widening repression under Stalin against former oppositionists or against 
supposed “enemies of the people.” Such a question challenges to a certain extent the 
Cold War era interpretation of the military purge which saw motivation for Stalin’s 
purge of the military as a move to destroying a potential force which could stop the 
escalation of Terror. Certain red army leaders were in fact quite hard-line when it 
came to supporting Stalin’s treatment of former oppositionists and willingly accepted 
the rhetoric of enemies of the people. Seen in a ‘Protocol of the meeting of the 
Commission of the Central Committee on the matter of Bukharin and Rykov’ 27 
February 1937, concerning the punishment to be metered to both enemies of the 
people, Iona Yakir, later to be purged in June 1937, voted for the death penalty.52 As 




line on the repression of the former opposition. Other senior military figures can also 
be seen as agreeing with the regime’s rhetoric of enemies of the people. For example, 
in a letter to Voroshilov, Tukhachevskii notes that problems in the power industry 
were not the result of poor work or inertia, but a consequence of sabotage and 
wrecking.53 A similar example concerns Uborevich. After the arrest of General 
Mikhailov for the crime of wrecking in industry in 1928, in a letter to Menzhinskii 
Uborevich proposes setting up a troika to report back to the Central Committee about 
wrecking activity in industry.54 The question is presented of how closely did the Red 
Army follow the Stalin line over repression, and as such, further questions emerge 
over why they were purged in 1937. If individuals such as Yakir did not protest 
against executing former oppositionists, what caused Stalin to perceive him as a threat 
to his power?  
   In contrast to this acceptance of the regime’s rhetoric over enemies of the people, 
there was a certain degree of disbelief in the plots regularly ‘unmasked’ by the secret 
police. The OGPU/NKVD had a long history of working up and revealing ‘plots’ in 
all areas of soviet society and the army did not escape this attention. Yet the extent to 
which these plots were given credibility and how they were perceived is an important 
issue.55 There was a certain amount of scepticism to the plots revealed by the Secret 
Police in certain periods and this was prevalent also within the soviet high command. 
Notably, in a letter to Mikhail Tomskii on 2 February 1928 concerning the Shakty 
Trial, Voroshilov questioned whether the OGPU was perhaps fabricating the case to 
an extent.56 Voroshilov’s attitude to counterrevolution is crucial as from May 1934 
Voroshilov had gained control of sanctioning each arrest in the military, an event 
itself which can be seen as distrust in the cases being presented by the OGPU.57 As 




thousands of military men on charges lacking any foundation. The question is why did 
this change occur and why did Voroshilov lose his earlier scepticism? In the Military 
Soviet of October 1936 it was acknowledged that fascist elements were active in the 
red army in schools and in commanding positions.58 Yet in contrast to the secret 
police’s appraisal the overall reliability of the red army was still held at a high level.59 
Indeed, a few months later at the February-March Plenum of 1937 Voroshilov noted 
that within the red army there were a smaller number of enemies of the people 
revealed relative to other sectors and institutions, but that increased vigilance was still 
required. Voroshilov noted that the Soviet Union sends its best people to the military. 
However, more ominously Molotov in his Molotov’s speech noted that the army 
would now be subject to a thorough checking.60 At a later meeting of military leaders 
in March 1937 Voroshilov gave a long report noting that the army was by no means 
clean from enemies of the people. Voroshilov seems to have taken a stronger line here 
from the February-March plenum regarding enemies yet to be unmasked with the 
ranks of the red army. Indeed, a commander from the Belorussian Military District, I. 
P. Belov, speaking at the same meeting, argued that the already arrested military men 
must still have a nest within the army, and one which the NKVD must uncover and 
that the army must help them do this.61 As such the attitudes of senior military figures 
must be seen alongside the shifting perceptions of the regime over counterrevolution 
and enemies of the people and changes concerning the general line.  
   A well-noted key event in the studies of the Terror is the exchange of Genrikh 
Yagoda for Nikolai Ezhov as People’s Commissar of Interior Affairs.62 This change 
affected the red army directly as Ezhov was far more active in working up plots than 
his predecessor.63 Within the materials detailing the process of rehabilitation of those 




Yagoda. Between 1932-33 compromising materials were received from Germany 
against senior military figures such as Tukhachevskii, Bliukher, Kamenev and 
Budennyi, and these materials were sent to Yagoda.64 Crucially however Yagoda was 
well aware of the secret police’s long history of spreading disinformation campaigns 
implicating military figures in supposed plots in order to gain information of genuine 
émigré underground organizations. In this particular episode Yagoda realized that the 
agent passing the information from Germany was a double-agent, and so the materials 
were dismissed.65 However, when Ezhov replaced Yagoda, further information was 
received from this same source shortly after the February-March Plenum of 1937 and 
was directed to Ezhov. However, in stark contrast to Yagoda Ezhov argued that the 
materials proved undoubtedly that a Trotskyist group existed in the military.66 As 
such Ezhov’s ascendency to the position of People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs 
had implications for increased NKVD activity within the red army and such a picture 
would be presented directly to Stalin. The impact of Ezhov has been examined in 
relation to the Terror as a whole, and it is clear that Ezhov had a strong hand in 
building the case against the military leaders who were executed in June 1937. 
Throughout the first six months of 1937 Ezhov sent Stalin details of those who had 
been arrested in the military on charges of counterrevolution leading to the main June 
1937 trial which revealed a widespread military conspiracy.67 However Ezhov’s role 
earlier in 1936 is also significant, when he was given sanction to arrest former 
supporters of the opposition, leading to the arrest of Trotskyist officers Primakov and 
Putna which turned attention to the red army.   
   As shown, published archival materials already allow a deeper and more rounded 
examination of the military purge in the areas of international relations, politics, 




military purge in line with explanations of the Terror as a whole and the forces 
driving this. The military purge was only one part of the Terror and the degree to 
which differing sectors of soviet society were interlinked should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, purge activity in the military should be seen as part of the 
same wider process occurring within the Party and industry, and not viewed in 
isolation. Ezhov’s rise shows this, as his activity touched upon and affected all 
spheres of soviet society. At the February-March Plenum it was announced that 
enemies of the people had been found in the Party, in industry, and now it was time 
for the military to be thoroughly checked. The purge of the military must be seen as 
being driven by the same processes which pushed forward the escalating Terror, even 
if the red army was a particular institution with its own particular responsibilities. 
However, in looking to answer why the military elite were purged in 1937 Stalin’s 
perception of events must be assessed and how his individual interpreted of the 
intelligence materials he received changed his perception of his army high command.   
   It is apparent that a practise of observation of the red army had been established 
from the end of the Civil War and Stalin received reports of plots and intrigues within 
the military at regular intervals. High profile military figures such as Tukhachevskii 
and Uborevich had figured in cases against the opposition in the early 1930s, but 
Stalin had not acted at this time, he still clearly had a level of trust in both men and 
indeed had discarded the OGPU attempt to implicate Tukhachevskii in 1930. Though 
Stalin would be unlikely to forget that both Tukhachevskii and Uborevich had been 
tainted by oppositional activity and associations. Ezhov’s rise in the mid-1930s is 
significant as he was more inclined to accept evidence against the military elite and 
sent Stalin details of arrested military men. Stalin at this time had a growing concern 




the build-up to war. Further, in such a period of high international tension it would not 
be unusual to question the reliability of the armed forces, the body that would defend 
the country if war came. The arrests of those who had previously supported Trotskii’s 
opposition in the 1920s within the Party, industry and army in summer 1936 are 
significant as this turned serious attention towards the red army. Ezhov believed there 
were more enemies of the people yet to be exposed after the arrest of the Trotskyist 
officers and in the February-March Plenum of 1937 Molotov declared that the army 
would be checked. It is here that as the military were put under strong pressure by the 
NKVD in 1937 and past oppositional associations, disputes and antagonisms between 
the military elite and the regime from the revolution would surface, but be seen in a 
new light, one of opposition.  
   We cannot say for sure what event would trigger Stalin’s sanction of the arrest of 
Tukhachevskii, but it is possible to understand the influences to his perception of the 
military elite and how these changed in before the outbreak of the Terror. With this in 
mind, such an explanation of the military purge can be advanced which goes beyond 
Stalin’s strive for greater power and beyond the focus on the “Tukhachevskii Affair”. 
In an atmosphere of growing spy-mania, international tension and an ever active 
secret police ‘revealing’ cases of counterrevolution, Stalin would question the 
reliability of his military, especially in light of compromising associations and 
rumours surrounding members of the high command since the Civil War. As Stalin 
became more convinced of, and endorsed, Ezhov’s visions of a widespread 
conspiracy in soviet society throughout 1936 the military became embroiled in the 
wider Terror and those who were perceived as compromised individuals were purged. 
Such a hypothesis requires further research and a firmer grounding in archival 




domestic and international events which were so vital in driving the Terror as a 
whole. Such an explanation of the military purge would show, importantly, that if 
Stalin acted as a result of his suspicions, this would not be an action with the intention 
of acquiring more dictatorial power and that the move against the military should not 
be regarded as a meticulously planned action, but more a panicked move from a 
misperception fuelled by the NKVD, international crisis and fear of counterrevolution 
within the army high command.   
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